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With the absence of a bipolar international system and the rise of globalization, 
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pursue. These can be competing or complementary.  The first is global integration.  The 
other course is to concentrate on regional integration.  The European Union is the best 
example of this today.   
Latin America also faces a choice in its future. Mercosur, the “Common Market 
of the South” is an economic initiative that offers promise of economic development. 
Begun in 1991 as an economic agreement between four nations in the Southern Cone, 
Mercosur made large gains in regional trade during its initial years.  As the global 
economy began lagging at the turn of the century, proponents for Mercosur have had a 
more difficult time arguing its benefits.  Should Mercosur survive this test, it could 
emerge stronger and continue to expand along the same lines politically and militarily as 
the European Union.   
This thesis will open by examining the evolution of Mercosur compared to the 
model of the European Union.  The next chapter will focus on the problems the Common 
Market has faced since its inception and how the actors have dealt with them.  It will 
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 I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the absence of a bipolar international system and the rise of globalization, 
there are two tracks of foreign diplomatic and economic policy that nation-states can 
pursue. These can be competing or complementary.  The first is global integration.  This 
is best exemplified by membership in the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization.  The other course is to concentrate on regional integration.  The European 
Union is the best example of this today.  Beginning as a series of economic agreements 
that were mutually beneficial, it later gave birth to an expanded legislative body, and now 
is implementing a common security and defense policy to include a rapid reaction force 
that threatens to infringe upon North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments.  This 
steady course toward supranational governance defies conventional wisdom that 
nationalism would prevent extensive integration.     
Latin America also faces a choice in its future, particularly since the absence of 
security dilemmas leads countries in the region to prioritize development.  Arie Kacowicz 
states that Latin American countries:   
Have no plausible alternative to economic globalization and political 
liberalism…and the sweeping neoliberal economic reform packages and 
the political transformation from authoritarian to democratic governments 
[are] the most important changes in contemporary Latin America.1 
There are two specific economic initiatives that offer promise of economic 
development specific to the region.  The first is the Free Trade Area of the Americas, an 
initiative to create a free trade zone between North and South America.  The second is 
Mercosur, the “Common Market of the South”.  Begun in 1991 as an economic 
agreement between four nations in the Southern Cone, Mercosur made large gains in 
regional trade during its initial years.  As the global economy began lagging at the turn of 
the century, proponents for Mercosur have had a more difficult time arguing its benefits.  
Should Mercosur survive this test, it could emerge stronger and continue to expand along 
the same lines politically and militarily as the European Union.   
                                                 
1 Arie Kacowicz, et al, “International Relations Theory and the New World Order”, Mershon 
International Studies Review 40, no. 2, (October 1996): 339-352. 
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There are several possible important outcomes for a unified Latin America.  For 
example, what impact would a supranational political union or common security force 
have on democracy in Latin America?  What effect would it have on current security 
issues such as counter-narcotics, terrorism, and poverty?   
This thesis will open by examining the evolution of Mercosur compared to the 
model of the European Union.  Two world wars of epic proportions gave rise to an 
economic alliance in Europe that would eventually evolve into the European Union.  The 
history of Latin America has been much different.  Somehow, they face the possibility of 
pursuing a similar end state.  This first chapter will explain how different causal factors 
can lead to similar results as Mercosur develops economically, politically, and possibly 
militarily. 
The next chapter will focus on the problems the Common Market has faced since 
its inception and how the actors have dealt with them.  It begins with an examination of 
the Treaty of Asuncion, which created Mercosur.  Next, it details the series of Protocols 
designed to “patch” inherent flaws in the original treaty.  Finally, it discusses the disputes 
that have occurred between member states that emphasize the weakness of the agreement.  
The conclusion will offer the corrective steps necessary for the project to succeed.   
The final chapter will focus on economic nationalism.  What is it and will it derail 
Mercosur?  The answer may be startling to some.  The chapter challenges the traditional 
definition of ‘economic nationalism’ and offers a new one based on a thorough 
examination of historical examples.  By applying this new definition, it will explain why 
economic nationalism can actually embrace liberal market reforms and could possibly 
provide a boon to Mercosur. 
The conclusion will summarize the arguments made and make a prediction on the 
future of Mercosur, the “Common Market of the South.” 
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II: THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MERCOSUR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter will examine the integration of the “Common Market of the South” 
as it developed economically and politically.  Furthermore, it will speculate on prospects 
for further “deepening” and “broadening.”  Is it feasible that Latin America will someday 
become as economically, politically, and militarily unified as the European Union is 
currently becoming?   It will explain why this is relevant. 
The chapter will be divided into three sections examining the economic, political, 
and potential military aspects of the agreement.  It will be followed with an analysis of 
the domestic and international variables that the author considers critical to its past or 
future success.  The conclusion will also discuss the implications that this further 
development may hold for U.S. foreign policy. 
B. ECONOMIC UNION 
Simon Bolivar’s dream of a “unified Latin America stretching from the Rio 
Grande to Cape Horn…remained quite elusive as nationalism took ever deeper root in the 
compartmentalized entities of the region”. 2  However, “after World War II, certain 
events intruded to shake the basic pattern”.  Perhaps the most important initiative of the 
“Great Awakening” was economic development.  Individual efforts yielded little results, 
as did foreign assistance.  The United States in particular was too concerned about 
economic recovery in Europe and Asia to offer much assistance.  Thus, Latin Americans 
would begin to look for a new option, which would take the form of “regional economic 
integration”. 3 
The prominent Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, in his role as Secretary-
General of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), strongly advocated 
regional economic integration.  He believed that industrialization had to occur in the 
region while protected by external tariffs, a model known as “import substitution 
industrialization”.  The ECLA worked hard through the 1950s toward removing both 
                                                 
2  Walter Krause and F. John Mathis, Latin America and Economic Integration, (Iowa City: University 
of Iowa Press, 1970), 2-3. 
3  Krause, 3.  
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political and economic obstacles to integration.  It would eventually be instrumental in 
creating the Central American Common Market in 1959 and the Latin American Free 
Trade Association in 1960.  The United States, would eventually endorse Latin American 
development as well.  Vice-President Nixon’s 1958 tour of the region and developments 
in Cuba would inspire some re-evaluation of priorities.  “Operation Pan America” would 
eventually help garner support for such projects as the Inter-American Development 
Bank.4 
The Treaty of Montevideo created the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA), between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.  It 
was to be implemented by 1972 but never got off the ground.  The biggest obstacle to 
success was “the inherent contradiction between the idea of giving impetus to integration 
via trade liberalization and the protectionist logic of the import-substitution model”.5  
The Treaty of Montevideo was altered in 1978, creating the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI).  Recognizing that LAFTA was too much too soon, it concentrated 
on less lofty goals with more precise timelines.  
The divide-to-conquer strategy of forming smaller agreements proved 
more successful in taking the talks to the next stage. Examples of smaller 
agreements are: the Agreement of Cartagena which created the `Andean 
Group' formed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; the `Group 
of Three' or G-3, formed between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela; the 
`Free Trade Zone' or ZLC, formed between Mexico and the five Central 
American countries. Bilateral agreements were also signed such as those 
between Chile and Argentina, and between Mexico and Venezuela, as well 
as the trilateral agreement involving Venezuela, Argentina and Mexico.6 
Late in 1979, the tripartite agreement was signed between Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay.  It would solve the longstanding disagreement concerning the use of border 
water resources.  The foreign debt crisis of 1982 still stunted any possibility of further 
cooperation for some time.  Eventually, in 1986, Argentina and Brazil would sign the 
Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE).  It was limited to “such areas 
                                                 
4    Krause, 3-4. 
5  Riordan Roett, ed., Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 1999), 8. 
6  Joaquina Pires-O'Brien, “Latin American Integration and The Formation of Mercosur”, 
Contemporary Review 276, no. 1613, (June 2000): 281. 
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as capital goods, food, technological cooperation, and the iron, steel, nuclear, and auto 
industries, among others”.7 
By the 1980s, the nations of the Southern Cone would begin to adopt liberal trade 
policies.  In November 1988, the Treaty on Integration, Cooperation, and Development 
was signed by Brazil and Argentina.  It was designed to have a more comprehensive 
bilateral market in place within a decade.  In mid-1990, Presidents Collor de Melo of 
Brazil and Menem of Argentina signed the Act of Buenos Aires moving the timeline up 
to 1995.8   
Finally, Treaty of Asuncion was signed in March 1991.  This formalized the 
Mercado Comun del Sur, or Mercosur, drawing Paraguay and Uruguay into the 
agreement.  It provided for reduction of internal tariffs, common external tariffs as high 
as 20-35%, coordination of macroeconomic policy, and sectoral agreements.9  The 
system was up and running by the following November.  “The trade during Mercosur's 
first eight years increased considerably, going from US$4.7 billion in 1991 to US$18 
billion in 1998.”10  Its immediate success maintained momentum toward growth through 
the mid-1990s.   
In 1993, Brazil proposed a South American Free Trade Area to include Mercosur, 
the Andean Pact, and Chile.  In 1995, Mercosur opened trade talks with the European 
Community and in 1996 included Chile and Bolivia as associate members.11  Bolivia had 
been originally barred for five years due to membership in the Andean Pact.  Chile does 
not want full membership “because it does not want to raise its tariff to the planned 
Common External Tariff (from about 8 percent to 12 percent) of Mercosur”.  However, 
the Mexico “Peso crisis” that soured popular opinion of NAFTA and caused the failure of 
the U.S delegation to gain ‘fast track’ authority to the Santiago FTAA summit in 1998 
                                                 
7  Roett, 9. 
8  Pires-O'Brien 
9  Roett, 10. 
10  Pires-O'Brien 
11  Roett, 15. 
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has caused Chile to rethink their position and consider full membership.12  Peru, also 
caught between ties to the region and the immense pressure of the U.S. economy, became 
an associate member of Mercosur in August 2003.   
The collapse of the WTO round in Cancun seems to have reinvigorated desire for 
increased regional trade.  The question remains which direction the agreement will go.   
There is no such thing as static equilibrium in integration schemes, as the 
European experience has shown so clearly.  One stage leads inexorably to 
another.  PTAs [Preferential Trade Agreements] either break up or move 
towards customs unions.  In the latter, the adoption of a common external 
tariff (CET) leads on to a single market; this in turn requires exchange rate 
harmonization, which- in the presence of capital mobility- implies 
monetary union.  The process is only complete when- as is the case of 
Bismarck’s Germany or the 19th century United States- economic 
integration leads to a single country.13 
President Lula of Brazil optimistically predicted partial or full incorporation of 
the Andean Pact countries by the beginning of 2004.14    
One major obstacle that Mercosur faces is the large disparity in size between the 
member states.  While the German economy dwarfed that of France, security concerns 
following two world wars was impetus for Germany to give France favorable terms on an 
economic agreement, the European Coal and Steel Community, which would later evolve 
into the European Union.   Furthermore, the United States fully encouraged this 
development. 
Latin America does not share the same kind of security dilemma.  Domestically, 
its motivation is purely economic.  Its benefits are not equal among its members and 
would lead to the disputes discussed in the next chapter: 
Nobody (except in France, maybe) can doubt that Germany is the 
European Union's paramount member. Yet its primacy is relative. Brazil, 
by contrast, towers over Mercosur...That could be a problem. Post-1945 
Germany had strong political reasons to embrace European integration...In 
                                                 
12  Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley, The United States and Latin America: The New 
Agenda, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 85. 
 
13   Ibid, 95. 
14  Juan Forero, “Brazil Pushes for South American Trade Pact”, New York Times, (Sep 17, 2003) 
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contrast, Brazil and Argentina have never fought a war, nor does either see 
the other as a source of instability. That may make integration between 
them easier, but, at first sight, it also makes the need for it less 
compelling.15  
The United States desires global free trade under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization and only seems to pursue loose regional Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in areas 
where the WTO does not suffice.  In Latin America, the United States would prefer to see 
the development of the Free Trade Area of the Americas or at a minimum, the extension 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement.   
U.S. government support of Mercosur has been lukewarm.  The mantra 
has been ‘Yes, the United States supports Mercosur as long as it meets the 
technical criteria set out in the World Trade Organization.16  
The European Union strongly encourages regional trading blocks, however, has 
given little direct support to Mercosur.  The possibility of a EU-Mercosur free trade area 
is unlikely, due to major stumbling blocks on issues such as agriculture subsidies.17  The 
October 31, 2004 deadline for a EU-Mercosur trade agreement, which has been in the 
works for the past five years, has recently passed with only promises to continue 
negotiations.18 
C. POLITICAL UNION 
In 1822, Simon Bolivar began an initiative to unite Colombia with Chile, Peru, 
Mexico, and Central America in a military alliance and to bring them together into a 
political confederation that would meet in Panama.  The purpose would be to help 
consolidate independence and protect against potential European intervention.  Spain, for 
instance, refused to acknowledge independence of its former colonies.  The threat would 
never materialize, whether due to Bolivar’s efforts or the Monroe Doctrine, which had 
tacit support of Great Britain, and support would dwindle.  By the 1830s, he had all but 
abandoned his hope for a politically unified Latin America and resignedly turned his 
                                                 
15  Michael Reid, “A Lopsided Union”, The Economist 341 no. 7987, (Oct 12, 1996): p. S9. 
16  Sidney Weintraub, Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone: Imperatives for U.S. 
Policy in South America, (Washington: The CSIS Press, 2000), xv. 
17  Bulmer-Thomas, 93-95. 
18  Anonymous. “The Americas: More Jaw-jaw, Mercosur and the EU” The Economist 373 no. 8399, 
(October 30, 2004): 68. 
 8
focus inward on Colombia.  The question remains whether his dream of political union 
can emerge from an economic pact almost two centuries later. 19 
The Treaty of Asuncion created the Common Market Council, composed of 
member country foreign and economic ministers and the Common Market Group.  The 
former was to direct the process of integration while the latter would see to the details.20  
No permanent dispute resolution mechanism was established in Asuncion, although the 
need was identified.  In 1994, the Protocol of Ouro Preto created the interim Mercosur 
Trade Commission and ad hoc arbitral panels to redress disputes rather than creating a 
supranational institution.  Brazil and Uruguay would have to amend their constitutions in 
order to recognize supranational authority.  This system has yet to be tried and all 
disputes have been settled through bilateral diplomacy to date.  At this time, it was clear 
that Mercosur was committed to the consensus model for the foreseeable future. 21  This 
is a problem: 
The Mercosur cannot simply rely on the parties to resolve their disputes.  
By definition if a dispute reaches the system it will be because the 
Mercosur parties could not reach a consensus on the meaning or operative 
effect of the Mercosur legislation or a country’s compliance with it.  The 
Mercosur needs, therefore, to have a neutral body for providing 
interpretation as well as enforcing the rule of law.22 
The lack of an effective arbitration mechanism would almost destroy Mercosur 
following a string of crises related to the Brazilian devaluation of the real in 1999.  In 
order to deal with recession in Brazil, the government allowed the real to float.  By no 
longer tying the real to the dollar, its value dropped significantly compared to the 
Argentine peso.  This had devastating impacts on the Argentine economy, especially the 
auto industry.  Cheap Brazilian imports flooded Argentina.  Leaders in both countries 
postured and seemed unwilling to trust the cumbersome arbitration process.  By 2001, 
                                                 
19  Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe to 
Clinton, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 16-27. 
20  Roett, 12. 
21  Cherie O'Neal Taylor “Dispute Resolution As A Catalyst For Economic Integration And An Agent 
For Deepening Integration: NAFTA and Mercosur” Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, (Winter 1996/Spring 1997) 
 
22  Ibid., 46. 
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Argentina was getting the worst of it and threatening to withdrawal from the union.  
Brazil relented, allowing temporary quotas and tariffs in direct violation of the 
agreement.  A common currency and an efficient supranational arbitration process could 
have avoided the worst effects of the crises.23 
After the Brazilian and Argentine devaluations, the deepening of Mercosur 
has become synonymous with survival, but there are several obstacles to 
achieving that goal. Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay have always 
favored the establishment of supranational institutions, but Brazil has 
always resisted them, preferring the intergovernmental model of ‘light 
institutionalism.’24  
 
In February 2002, the presidents of the member states signed the Protocol of 
Olivos for Dispute Settlement.  It was a direct result of the 1999-2001 crises and created 
a permanent tribunal five arbitrators.  The tribunal will review award settlements by ad 
hoc tribunals and will have “binding final judgment”.25 
A supranational institution that could negotiate on behalf of the collective 
member states would increase bargaining power internationally.  This prevents larger 
economies such as the United States and the European Union from pursuing a ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy.   
Because one of the region’s international objectives of Mercosur is to 
strengthen the region’s international negotiating position, the perception 
exists that Mercosur’s institutional mechanisms must be deepened to 
guarantee the group’s visibility in the international arena. 26 
On June 18, 2003, the presidents of the Mercosur member states met again in 
Asuncion.  They made verbal commitments to a regional parliament, similar to the 
European Union’s, inclusion of Peru and Venezuela, and negotiation toward the FTAA as 
                                                 
23  Mario E Carranza, “Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on Mercosur”, 
Latin American Politics and Society 45, no. 2, (Summer 2003), 67. 
24  Carranza 
25  Carranza 
26  Roett, 20. 
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a single body.27  Although these measures are far from complete, it shows that the idea is 
surely still alive.    
The process of creating a supranational political body is a challenging one.  A 
gradual, minimalist approach is necessary.  Early on, progress is dependent on consensus.  
Not only is it necessary to determine if this kind of integration is beneficial to the 
individual member states, but then it is necessary to convince the population at large that 
they stand to benefit.  Europe is still selling their citizens on the advantages of 
integration.  Latin American experiences with liberal market reforms have not been 
altogether positive, making it more of a challenge.  Further political integration will 
depend heavily on Brazil’s desire for global status.  In order to gain clout internationally, 
they will have to invest a little of their sovereignty in a strong Mercosur. 
Externally, the United States seems to passively oppose further political 
integration of Latin America.  It is likely that Washington will make every attempt to 
play the spoiler in order to refocus on an economic union that includes the United States.  
This could place emphasis on the World Trade Organization, the FTAA, or a NAFTA 
“plus”.   
D. MILITARY UNION 
The European Union has created a Rapid Reaction Forces and is formulating a 
Common Defense and Security Policy.  If Mercosur were to follow suit by creating a 
peacekeeping force under Mercosur, the implications could be enormous for democracy 
and stability in the region.  
“Mercosur…has placed consolidating democracy and preserving peace in the 
Southern Cone among its paramount objectives.”28  The most significant positive 
militarily cooperative step that members of Mercosur had agreed to was the 1990 
bilateral arms reductions between Brazil and Argentina.29  In 1996, Argentina and Brazil 
also agreed upon what would become the Rio Declaration.  Not only was this a “strategic 
alliance” between the two countries, but it also added a “democratic clause” for 
                                                 
27  World Press Review Online, “New Life for Mercosur”, (accessed September 14, 2003); available 
from http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/1204.cfm; Internet.    
28  Jeffry Frieden, Manual Pastor, Jr., and Michael Tomz, Modern Political Economy and Latin 
America: Theory and Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press), 2000, 188. 
29  Roett, 37. 
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Mercosur.  Fear of exclusion would later deter non-democratic forces from seizing power 
in Paraguay.30   
Argentina strongly favors a Mercosur peacekeeping force and has the support of 
the United States in the endeavor. 
The effort began in April 1997, when Presidents Carlos Menem of Argentina and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil signed an accord creating a Permanent Mechanism 
of Consultation and Coordination on Defense and Security Affairs, designed to discuss a 
common defense system for the MERCOSUR region.31 Concurrently, Argentina 
opposed Brazil taking a seat on the U.N. Security Council, suggesting instead a rotating 
Latin American seat.32 
Brazil has an opposing view regarding a regional peacekeeping force, although 
they are not against confidence building exercises with their neighbors.  This has resulted 
in joint exercises, shared participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and common 
airspace control. 
Brazil has supported a wider, not deeper MERCOSUR. It wanted other 
nations to join but did not want the European Union, with its supranational 
institutions, to be the model. As the region's giant, Brazil wants free trade 
to function but does not want to be disciplined by a bureaucracy composed 
of civil servants from smaller, weaker states.  Its position regarding 
military affairs is similar. It supports military cooperation, but is still only 
lukewarm to Argentine proposals for security systems that would impose 
the potentially binding decisions of supranational agencies. Indeed, 
President Cardoso has seen no need for military alliances with states 
inside or outside the region because, in his view, Brazil has no enemies.33 
It will not happen without at least passive support by Brazil.  Brazil does not seem 
to favor a regional security force at this time.  Unconvinced of the benefit, it may oppose 
the Argentine movement for its creation.  It should be noted, however, that should 
Mercosur expand, it would include some states that could benefit from a regional security 
force.  Brazil may find itself in a position where it is economically advantageous to 
                                                 
30  Roett, 41-42. 
31  David Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the 
Southern Cone”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 1. (Spring 2000), 43. 
32  Roett, 42. 
33  Pion-Berlin, 43. 
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compromise politically.  Furthermore, Brazil has long desired a permanent seat in the 
United Nations Security Council.  Sponsoring an active multi-national peacekeeping 
force could help their case. 
Following the 2004 crisis in Haiti, South American states comprised the majority 
of the U.N. peacekeeping force.  Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile took the lead in 
the venture.  This may signal a turnaround by President Lula da Silva in the Brazilian 
reluctance toward a regional security force.34   
Embroiled in other military ventures around the globe, the U.S. would greet a 
Latin American security force with enthusiasm. However, the mere fact that the U.S. 
favors a regional security force may cause Brazilian pride to impede further progress.  
Nevertheless, as Latin American militaries become more professional, it is not impossible 
that more extensive cooperation will occur.  There is an added incentive for Latin 
America, who has historically been the recipient of repeated U.S. intervention, to have an 
independent force capable of handling regional security issues such as narco-trafficking, 
terrorism, and immigration.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Economic integration within Mercosur marches forward slowly.  Extensive Latin 
American political or military unification seems far-fetched in the short term.  The 
quelling of bilateral disputes in the region surely contributed to the creation of Mercosur, 
but was not the priority.  The dominant motivation, of course, was money.  Member 
states may recognize the need for further political integration, but nationalism is holding 
them back.  A common security and defense policy is merely an idea at this point, 
opposed by Mercosur’s most dominant member.  Brazil does favor broadening at this 
time, the faster the better.  If Mercosur wishes to stay viable, deepening of supranational 
political institutions will have to occur as well.  This will cost a portion of each state’s 
sovereignty. 
There are several possible important outcomes for a unified Latin America.  
Political stability is the most prominent.  It speaks volumes that the mere threat of 
exclusion from an economic merger was enough to keep Paraguay at least officially 
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democratic.  The “Rio Declaration” demonstrates Mercosur’s commitment to democracy 
and economic prosperity can only help to alleviate poverty. 
Should Mercosur expand to include the Andean Pact countries, it will encounter a 
new host of security issues that would threaten to restrict or undermine economic gains.  
A multi-national regional security force could assist with counter-narcotics or counter-
terrorism within another country’s borders without raising the same degree of alarm that 
the armed forces of a single neighbor’s armed forces might. 
Ultimately, the United States can only gain by increased trade with Latin 
America.  The question remains whether Mercosur will broaden and deepen in order to 
present a unified front in FTAA discussion or the U.S. will successfully leverage bilateral 
negotiations to undermine Brazilian efforts.   
U.S. promotion of a regional security force is a wise course based on a history of 
interventionism that has fostered distrust in the region.  Ultimately everyone gains by 
stable, democratic regimes willing to tackle narcotics and terrorism within their borders.   
The motivation for further integration is there.  A gradual, minimalist approach 
may someday yield a stronger Latin American union.  The next chapter will address 
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III. ASUNCION TO OLIVOS:  AN ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINE-
BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DISPUTES SINCE 1991 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The previous chapter discussed the evolution of Mercosur economically, 
politically, and militarily; and highlighted some of the advantages that further integration 
may bring.  This chapter will focus on the shortcomings of Mercosur, where inadequate 
planning and Machiavellian diplomacy threaten to dismantle the project and the 
responses that these crises invoked.    
The Treaty of Asuncion created Mercosur, the “Common Market of the South,” in 
1991.  Due to the immense impact of domestic politics involved, it is useful to evaluate 
the debate surrounding its creation using Robert Putnam’s “metaphor” of the two-level 
game.  This chapter will open with a detailed analysis of what a two-level game is and 
then demonstrate its applicability by examining the events surrounding the creation of 
Mercosur.  Furthermore, it will show the long term negative impact of Menem’s large 
win-set on the economic body.In the second section, this chapter will enumerate the 
various Protocols, or “patches,” to the Asuncion Treaty designed to address weaknesses 
in the dispute resolution system.  These Protocols were a direct result of the asymmetrical 
bargain created at Asuncion.  Outlining the basic tenets of the Protocols of Brasilia, Ouro 
Preto, and Olivos, it will demonstrate the apparent opposition to strengthening the 
institutions of Mercosur. 
The third section will discuss the severe crises that have threatened to break apart 
Mercosur.  Stemming from divergent macroeconomic policies, these crises were 
unavoidable with the existing dispute resolution system and the failure to attempt 
resolution through existing institutions demonstrated a lack of confidence in the 
institutional capabilities.  Only concerted efforts at the highest levels were able to 
preserve Mercosur. 
The conclusion will summarize the ideas presented and attempt to conclude 
whether the obstacles to integration between Argentina and Brazil, the giants of 
Mercosur, can be overcome. 
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B. TREATY OF ASUNCION   
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived 
as a two-level game.  At the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At 
the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.  Central decision-makers can 
ignore neither of the two games, so long as their countries remain 
interdependent, yet sovereign.35 
The essence of this assertion by Putnam is that there are two distinct yet 
interrelated aspects to negotiations by diplomats and national leaders.  The first level is 
that of the international arena.  While the rational actor in a realist system may try to 
maximize the interests of his country, he will be faced with a counterpart across the 
negotiating table that will be doing the same.  The second level is the domestic arena.  
Even should a negotiator find a proposal acceptable, it must gain “ratification” of some 
sort by his constituents.  Therefore, the negotiators must seek a “win-set.”  
When examining Putnam’s proposition, it is easiest to examine the desired 
outcome first and work backward.  His dependent variable is simply an international 
agreement.  This can be economic, military or other.  For Putnam’s model to be useful, 
however, the agreement must be arranged by a single negotiator (Level I) and subject to 
ratification by domestic constituents (Level II).    
The intervening variable is the win-set.  He defines this as “the set of all possible 
Level I agreements that could ‘win’- that is, gain the necessary majority among the 
constituents- when simply voted up or down.”36  The win-sets of both negotiators must 
overlap for an agreement (DV) to be concluded. 
There are three determinants, or independent variables, that influence the “size” 
of the win-set.  The larger the size, the more latitude the negotiator is given toward 
compromise.   Coalitions, institutions, and strategies of the chief negotiator are Putnam’s 
independent variables.  These define the myriad of possible solutions that comprise the 
win-set.  Each will be discussed in turn. 
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The first independent variable is the “distribution of power, preferences, and 
possible coalitions among Level II constituents.”  If the cost of no-agreement is 
unacceptable, the constituents will allow more concessions and a larger win-set.  If the 
status quo is acceptable, they will insist the negotiator drive a harder bargain.  
Constituents with relatively homogenous interests often find themselves in the yes-or-no 
category.  When constituents are polarized on an issue, the swing voters in the middle 
define the size of the win-set.  This can get terribly complex, as options may have to be 
pursued that enables coalitions in support of the agreement.  Abstention rate also must be 
factored in.  The more politicized an issue becomes; the more constituents are likely to 
weigh in, further constricting the win-set.  This is why diplomats prefer closed-door 
negotiations.37  
The second variable is the actual composition and ratification procedures of “the 
Level II political institutions.”  This could refer to the political or legal process that an 
agreement is subject to.  For example, international treaty ratification in the U.S. Senate 
requires a 2/3 vote.  This is significantly more difficult than a simply majority vote and 
narrows a negotiators win-set.  A dictator that requires no ratification has a larger win-set 
and may actually be at a disadvantage, assuming his counterpart knows this.   Sometimes 
there may be multiple levels of ratification.  For example, just because a president has the 
ability to push an agreement through the formal legal process, he may face sufficient 
repercussions in public opinion that would be unacceptable.38   
The third variable rests in the “strategies of the Level I negotiators.”  The ultimate 
goal of every Level I negotiator is to maximize his opponent’s win-set while ensuring his 
expands just enough to overlap.  This ensures that the agreement reached cannot only be 
ratified (due to the overlap) but is closer to his optimal outcome.39   
Using this model, we will examine the formation of Mercosur, the “Common 
Market of the South” and the process by which Argentina and Brazil entered the 
agreement.   
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Through the 1960s, Latin American governments had engaged in protectionist 
policies in order to industrialize.  Economist Raul Prebisch, as the Secretary-General of 
the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), advocated a model known 
as “import substitution industrialization” (ISI).  By the late 1970s, this model was 
generally proven a failure.  Through the 1980’s, neoconservative Latin American 
governments began to liberalize their economies, supported by the ‘Washington 
Consensus.’   
Regional integration gained new momentum in 1991, with the creation of the 
European Union at Maastricht.  Concurrently, four nations from Latin America would 
sign the Treaty of Asuncion, forming the “Common Market of the South,” creating the 
third largest trading bloc in the world, behind the European Union and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.  Brazil dominated the bloc, accounting for more than 
70 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of the union.  Argentina was the only real 
competitor.  Paraguay and Uruguay had little choice but to join or risk being 
economically squeezed between the two.  It is only fitting that divergent economic 
policies of Argentina and Brazil would almost lead to the breakdown of Mercosur 
between 1999 and 2001.  The roots of the disagreement rest in the two-level game that 
created Mercosur. 
The chief negotiators in Mercosur agreements and disputes have always been the 
presidents.   The dependent variable in this case, the agreement that consummated 
Mercosur, was no exception.  President Menem of Argentina and President Collor de 
Melo of Brazil signed it on March 26, 1991.  Essentially, it would drop internal tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers while creating a Common External Tariff on imports.   
 In signing the treaty, President Collor had a much less scope in his win-set than 
President Menem.  Subsequently, he achieved terms that would be favorable to Brazil.  In 
fact, the terms were so lopsided; they would almost collapse Mercosur in 1999 and again 
in 2001.   
 President Menem strongly favored neo-liberal market reforms.  He “enjoyed a 
solid majority in the legislature” as well as “much more autonomy from domestic forces.”  
Menem was able to open the national market by decree, “successfully neutralizing the 
political opposition of domestic industrial sectors, such as textiles, electronics, 
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automobile parts, and pharmaceutical laboratories, all of them threatened by foreign 
competition because of trade liberalization.”  Menem had been given a mandate by the 
success of the Cavallo Plan, which pegged the peso to the dollar, thereby controlling 
hyperinflation.  Menem’s independent variables; his strategies, the lack of a need for a 
coalition, and the lack of institutional restraint, gave him a very large win-set.  By 
agreeing to accept the terms of Asuncion, he placed his nation in a position to be 
dominated by Brazilian industry and extremely susceptible to Brazilian macroeconomic 
policy.40 
Conversely, President Collor “had to form political coalitions while heeding to the 
demands of powerful domestic business organizations and negotiating with opposition 
parties in Parliament.”  The “internationalist-proglobalization neoliberal coalition was 
weaker in Brazil than in Argentina.”  Furthermore, “Brazilian industrialists...sometimes 
[had] veto power over decisions affecting their interests.”  Collor’s independent 
variables; his need to form coalitions and his institutional constraints, constrained his 
win-set tightly.41   
The final product signed in 1991 was closer to what Brazil wanted than 
what Argentina (or Paraguay and Uruguay, for that matter).  It called for a 
high Common External Tariff to be implemented faster that the three 
dissenters wanted.  It placed very limited controls on macroeconomic 
policy and had a weak arbitration policy.  Brazilian devaluation of the real 
in 1999 (and again in 2001) would have devastating effects on the 
Argentine economy.  Eventually, Brazil would have to allow certain 
temporary internal quotas and tariffs by Argentina to prevent them from 
withdrawing from the union.  By this time, Brazil was using Mercosur to 
strengthen their bargaining position in “Free Trade Area of the Americas” 
(FTAA) negotiations and could not afford its dissolution.42 
The main provisions of the Treaty of Asuncion were an across the board tariff 
reduction within the union with the addition of a common external tariff.  It allowed 
development of accords for specific sectors.  The Council of the Common Market would 
consist of finance and foreign ministers from the member states.  The Common Market 
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Group would be the executive institution of the arrangement.  Annex III of the agreement 
provided an institutional framework to solve trade litigation, although as the next section 
will demonstrate, it was a grossly inadequate arrangement.43 
C. THE PROTOCOLS (ASUNCION 1.1, 1.2, & 1.3) 
As even those of us who have been slow to embrace the high-speed world of the 
“digital age” have become aware of the term “patch.”  This term is generally used to 
describe a temporary software fix, usually due to unforeseen problems.  Often this is a 
result of rushing a program into stores before proper testing.  The Treaty of Asuncion had 
some critical errors in it, most notably the lack of an effective dispute resolution system.   
This built-in weakness was a deliberate attempt by the member states to maintain 
sovereignty by minimizing the impact of a supranational arbiter to have jurisdiction over 
potential disagreements that could have a large impact on their economy.44  Regardless, 
three “patches” would be introduced to Mercosur.  The Protocols of Brasilia, Ouro Preto, 
and Olivos would make changes to the temporary arbitration process until the Permanent 
Dispute Resolution System was implemented, planned for January 2006.  
The first “patch” was as early as December of 1991.  The Protocol of Brasilia for 
the Solution of Controversies replaced a three-step system found in Annex III to the 
Treaty of Asuncion.  It provided for suits between states or between a private party and a 
state.  Parties would be given 15 days to work it out or go before the Common Market 
Group, comprised of appointees of the various ministries of foreign affairs.  The 
Common Market Group had 30 days to come to attempt a solution.  If this did not work, 
either state party could request a three-person ad hoc arbitration panel that would issue a 
binding decision by majority vote in 90 days.  The major weakness under this system was 
a limitation that private parties could not progress to the final arbitration panel without 
state sponsorship.45 
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The Protocol of Ouro Preto was signed December 17, 1994 and put into effect in 
December 1998 by Common Market Decision 17/98.  The Protocol “established an 
imperfect customs union with a common external tariff covering 85% of goods traded by 
the bloc with third countries.”46  Furthermore, in a small move toward deeper 
institutions, the Mercosur Trade Commission was created and was given authority to 
review complaints.  Technical committees within the Commission would attempt to work 
out a solution.  If it could not be resolved in 30 days, it would be forwarded to the 
Common Market Group and then on to binding arbitration. Between its implementation 
in 1998 and May of 2002, eight cases went to arbitration.  Although all the parties 
seemed to accept the decisions of the panels, it is worth noting that none of the cases 
involved the sizeable automotive sector.47   
The Protocol of Olivos for Dispute Settlement was signed February 18, 2002 by 
the presidents and foreign ministers of the four Mercosur countries.  Brazil was the final 
country to ratify it in February 2004.48   Brazil will still have to amend their constitution 
to make it legal.49  Still transitional in nature, Olivos will maintain the same basic 
structure of the Brasilia Protocol, but will create the Permanent Tribunal of Review, will 
allow better oversight for arbitration panels to ensure compliance, and will streamline the 
resolution process bypassing the highly political Common Market Group.50 
The dispute resolution process within Mercosur to date has been “cumbersome” 
and infrequently used.51  The biggest challenges to the union have been settled through 
presidential diplomacy avoiding the flawed system altogether.  However, the Protocol of 
Olivos and the pending Permanent Dispute Resolution System should provide an 
effective means for both private and state parties to address grievances in the future.   
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D. THE MERCOSUR CRISES 
Since 1994, Mercosur has weathered a series of crises that highlight the lack of a 
harmonized macroeconomic policy.  Disputes within the $15 billion per year automotive 
sector began in 1995, threatening to dissolve the union.  Brazil devaluated the real in 
1999 and 2001 while the Argentine peso remained pegged to the U.S. dollar.    In a 
strange twist, the Argentine financial crisis of 2002 may have had a somewhat positive 
effect on Argentine-Brazilian relations. 
President Cardoso first introduced the Real Plan in 1994.  Similar to the Cavallo 
Plan, it “tied the Brazilian currency, the real, to the nation’s dollar reserves and kept a 
tight rein on the money supply.”52  However, by keeping the real artificially high, it 
exacerbated the trade deficit for Brazil for the next few years.53  In June 1995, in 
response to this and to minimize the “tequila effect” of the Mexican peso crash, Brazil: 
…established a temporary quota for automobile imports, without 
exempting Argentina from the new regime.  In addition, it reduced from 
18 percent to 2 percent the tariff on imports of capital goods, components, 
and raw materials for the sector, thereby matching the benefits of the 
regime granted by Argentina to automobile manufacturers operation in 
Argentina, which interpreted these measures as a violation of the customs 
union agreement.54   
The resulting crisis would persist through 1999 and eventually threaten the 
economic union.  Resolution was attempted at the highest levels by exempting vehicles 
from tariffs based on the proportion of local parts, requiring 60% to qualify as locally 
manufactured.  The common external tariff for automobiles would be set at 35% at the 
end of 1999.  This was a drop from 49% for Brazil and an increase from 33½% for 
Argentina.  Furthermore, Brazil would agree not to add new subsidies after 1999 without 
consensus among the four Mercosur partners.55   
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“The true nature of the dispute was made clear when Brazil announced its new 
quota policy.”  Carlos Magarinos, the Argentine industry secretary observed, “The real 
dispute is over investments.”  Concerned with unlimited imports of autos from a more 
business-friendly Argentina, Brazil was forcing transnational manufacturers to stay 
invested in Brazil.  The director of Toyota Argentina, upon learning of the quotas, said 
“the only people surprised at what happened are those who don’t understand the 
traditional policies of Brazil, which have been, if not imperialistic, at least 
overwhelming.”56 
On January 12, 1999, Brazil would devalue the real by nearly 40% with 
devastating effects on the Argentine economy.  Three days later it was floated at market 
value.  “In a desperate attempt to stabilize the real and keep foreign investment from 
leaving the country, the government raised interest rates several times that month, but the 
currency continued to decline.”  The real would drop as low as 2:1 to the dollar (and 
subsequently the Argentine peso, pegged at 1:1).57   
This would reopen and expand the auto crisis, threatening the industry that 
accounted for 8% of Argentine manufacturing.  Auto production in Argentina had grown 
from 64,000 vehicles produced in 1988 to 457,000 in 1998.58  In February 1999, The 
Wall Street Journal reported: 
Brazilian devaluation will slash auto production in neighboring Argentina 
between 20 and 50% this year, put several Argentine parts suppliers out of 
business and could undermine the trade ties crafted by the two countries in 
the past four years, auto executives and union officials say.59 
The crisis would escalate, expanding to include a broad spectrum of cheap 
Brazilian goods pouring into Argentina.  Menem would respond with a series of 
retaliatory tariffs, quotas, and threats.  Brazil would respond in kind.  By July 1999, 
Brazil suspended negotiations and threatened to dissolve Mercosur.  President Menem 
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would meet with President Cardoso in a “desperate attempt to solve the crisis.”  By the 
end of the year, the panic subsided on its own due to expiring tariffs, voluntary export 
restrictions, and some arbitration.  There was even a partial recovery in 2000.60 
A final automotive regime was established only at the June 2000 
presidential summit in Buenos Aires.  The agreement creates and 
Automotive Committee, which will administer the regime at the end of a 
“transition phase” (in 2003).61 
Argentina’s lack of flexibility under the Cavallo Plan would only serve to drag 
their economy further into a hole.  In order to pays its mounting debt, Argentina took 
$39.7 billion aid package from the International Monetary Fund in December 2000.  As 
the Brazilian economy slowed it early 2001, the real dropped another 32%.  By August, 
the IMF would approve another $8 billion to Argentina to prevent default on the $150 
billion already owed.  Domingo Cavallo, in a return as economy minister, sought stronger 
ties with the U.S. and wanted to revert Mercosur to a free trade area.62      
This time, Brazil would make concessions to keep Mercosur alive.  The Common 
Market Council voted to allow Argentine tariffs that were in clear violation of the 
customs union until the end of 2002.  The intent was to give Argentina time to recover by 
a temporary “suspension” of the union.  The ongoing FTAA negotiations provided Brazil 
with further incentive to placate their partner.  Eventually, President Cardoso de la Rua 
agreed to create a “temporary bilateral mechanism of safeguards inspired by the rules of 
the World Trade Organization.”63 
In December 2001, Argentina was forced to default on the $30 billion due in 
foreign loans.   In January 2002, Argentina finally came off the pegged exchange rate.  
The overvalued peso coupled with excessive foreign debt plunged Argentina into a deep 
financial crisis. 64 
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Harvard economics professor Martin Feldstein asserts that the shift from the 
pegged rate should have happened sooner.  It was held too long due to fear of returning to 
hyperinflation.  Furthermore, it still would have worked if the peso had become more 
competitive by productivity increasing faster that wages.  This would have permitted 
Argentine prices to decline relative to those abroad.  Initially, from 1991-1994, Argentina 
experienced 7% growth.  However, a combination of rigid labor laws and strong union 
pressures prevented further reduction in production costs.  Also, the dollar strengthened 
from 1995 to 2000 bringing the peso up with it.  The Brazilian devaluation in 1999 was 
the fatal blow.  The government was forced to raise interest rates, causing recession.  
Unemployment climbed to 15%.  Still unions refused to cut wages.65   
Ironically, the Argentine financial crisis may have had a long-term positive effect 
on Mercosur.   By unfairly blaming Washington, Argentines have found common cause 
with Brazil in their time of trouble.   
In sharp contrast to the perceived callous indifference of the United States 
to Argentina’s plight, Brazil announced in February 2002 that it would 
open its market to Argentine imports by immediately eliminating any 
remaining tariff and nontariff barriers.66  
Brazil also agreed to set a 2:1 vice import-to-export ratio for autos vice the 
previous 1:1 ratio.  Furthermore, “Argentine devaluation allowed Argentina and Brazil to 
discuss their bilateral problems in a common language, raising hopes that Mercosur 
would be ‘relaunched’ in 2002”.67 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the agreements that created and modified Mercosur 
and the handling of subsequent disputes.  By framing the events at Asuncion as a two-
level game, it helps us determine a whether these disputes are an obstacle to further 
integration or a chance for the states to draw closer by working toward a shared goal.   
The realist model presumes that states are the dominant actor in an anarchic world 
and concerned with maintenance of sovereignty.   The two-level game necessarily 
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includes a domestic level of analysis, introducing an element of the broad liberal 
paradigm.  However, it does assume the rational actor is in pursuit of his own best 
interest, a theme sufficiently demonstrated in this section as well as the ensuing parts of 
the paper.  The various Protocols demonstrate an apparent effort to be noncommittal 
regarding supranational authority.  This is almost certainly in keeping with the realist 
tradition.   
The final section concerns the crises that threatened the arrangement.  Initially, 
they all support the tendency toward realism.  Manzetti observes that according to the 
“realist definition…decline should accelerate.”68  Indeed, that appears to be the case:   
Problems of relative gains have begun to arise.  Thus far the four countries 
have been able to address most of the disputes that have arisen more or 
less successfully, either through new internal arrangements or the offer of 
side payments.”69  
However, the ostensible reversal of Brazil’s policy toward Argentina in 2001 and 
the perseverance of Mercosur in the face of apparent doom make an uncomplicated 
conclusion impossible.  The realist can only offer one other explanation.  Mercosur is 
more useful to Brazil alive than dead.  Roett’s summary of Brazilian motivations supports 
this. 
Brazilian concerns are geared less to Argentina than to the United States, 
which is perceived as a major constraint on Brazil’s pursuit of its national 
interest…Argentines center their apprehensions on the expansion of 
Brazilian power, with beliefs about Brazil falling into two camps…[the 
first believing Mercosur is] not a zero-sum game so long as common 
interests are preserved.  The other side, however, endorses the idea that 
political alignment with the United States must be maintained to 
counterbalance the expansion of economic ties with the Brazilian 
economy.70  
So with this explanation comes the traditional balance of power theory.  Despite 
aspects of liberal explanations, Thucydides could easily have explained Argentine-
Brazilian international relations since 1991 in the ‘realist’ tradition.  This implies that the 
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individual states will only pursue further integration if it is there own best interest.  This 
is a difficult question and is outside the scope of this thesis.  If the member states believe 
this is the case, Mercosur has a bright future.  However, even if this is the case, could 
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IV: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND MERCOSUR:  
COMPLEMENTARY OR CONTRADICTORY? 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The term “economic nationalism” is traditionally used to describe macroeconomic 
policies that are diametrically opposed to liberal economic policies.  This may not 
necessarily be the case.  In fact, this chapter begins by examining Eric Helleiner’s 
argument that this statement is untrue.  Dr. Helleiner is a graduate of the London School 
of Economics and a professor of international political economics at Trent University.  
By his definition, economic nationalism can sometimes actually endorse liberal 
macroeconomic polices.  He makes a very convincing argument that suggests further 
integration of Mercosur could be assisted by economic nationalism. 
Helleiner makes two critical assertions.  First, he states “economic nationalism is 
most properly defined by its nationalistic content rather than as a variant of realism or as 
an ideology of protectionism.”71  This is important because it places the interest of the 
nation above that of any individual sector within a national economy by attempting to 
define the national interest. 
Based on this premise, Helleiner further proposes that “[economic nationalism] 
can be associated with a wide range of policy projects, including the endorsement of 
liberal economic policies.”72  This is a major departure from conventional wisdom.   
The second section will further examine Helleiner’s four “strands” of economic 
nationalism throughout history.  They are infant-industry protection, macroeconomic 
activism, autarchic economic nationalism, and liberal economic nationalism.  Each strand 
will be examined to see if it fits the new definition using examples from Latin America.  
Each case will highlight the fact that economic nationalism can, in fact, lead to liberal 
economic policies. 
The final section will focus on Mercosur, where this new perspective has 
enormous consequences for framing the debate on further integration.  While the free 
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flow of goods within the common market is a hallmark of liberal economic policies, 
detractors will argue that a tradition of protectionism and “economic nationalism” in the 
region guarantee a short life expectancy for this experiment.  Furthermore, differences in 
currency have caused great schisms within Mercosur.  Can that be rectified by a common 
currency?   
The conclusion will attempt, if possible, to determine whether Mercosur is will 
face another obstacle in economic nationalism. 
B. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM DEFINED 
There does not seem to be a consensus definition of economic nationalism in 
practice today.  The term “economic nationalism” first appeared between the two World 
Wars of the 20th century.73  This ambiguous concept was generally applied as the root of 
all tariffs, quotas, subsidies, restrictions on foreign direct investment, and economic 
autarchy.  This broad usage only muddied the meaning further until the term was not 
functional.  In fact, Michael Heilperin noted, “at best economic nationalism is an 
indefinite term, used by its opponents, more than by its proponents.”74    
In the 1970s, as the field of international relations took more interest in 
international political economy, economic nationalism was neatly positioned in the realist 
milieu.  Robert Gilpin suggested that economic nationalists were actors within the state 
that assumed that the “world market economy operates to the disadvantage of the 
economy and domestic welfare.”  Furthermore, while all realists might not be 
nationalists, all nationalists were realists. 75 
This had two effects.  The first was a step in the right direction by reminding 
economists that there are important sub-actors in the global economy.  Previously, David 
Ricardo and Richard Cobden portrayed economics with a very “cosmopolitan”76 
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perspective.77  They were correct that the world market balances itself, however, it often 
does so at the expense of one or more national economies.  As the electoral franchise 
expanded in the 20th century, governments were forced to be more activist.78  No 
government could allow their national economy to be the loser when the unemployed had 
a right to vote. By recognizing the importance of nations as actors in the global economy, 
it is easier to understand the impact of economic nationalism. 
The second effect of equating economic nationalism with realism is the risk of 
oversimplification.  Helleiner’s definition of economic nationalism does not equate the 
goals of the state with that of the nation.  The “state” usually is viewed as “the political 
institutions…government…geographical boundaries, and the monopoly over use of force 
within those boundaries.”79  The “nation” represents a group of people “that share a 
common identity, and usually a common language and history,” who grant political 
legitimacy to the state.80   George Crane concurs that the “state and nation may overlap 
in various ways but the national identity is not simply an expression of state interest.”81  
Rawi Abdelal adds “economic nationalism should describe a perspective more concerned 
with the influence of national identities and nationalism on economic policy.” 82  
One can sum up Helleiner’s definition of economic nationalism as a “set of 
policies that result from a shared national identity, or from the predominance of a specific 
nationalism in the politics of a state.” 83  This definition provides a lens to examine the 
“strands” of economic nationalism. 
C. THE FOUR STRANDS  
Helleiner has identified four strands of economic nationalism throughout modern 
history.  They are infant-industry protection, macroeconomic activism, autarchic 
economic nationalism, and liberal economic nationalism.  Each will be examined in turn. 
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Infant-industry protection calls for protective tariffs or subsidies until the new 
industry becomes competitive in the world market.  Taken too far, this creates an 
inefficient industry by allowing excesses that would normally be corrected in response to 
normal competition.  As long as these trade barriers remained in place, this practice met 
the traditional definition of economic nationalism.  If it served the nation as a whole, then 
it would meet Helleiner’s standard as well. 
Nineteenth century economist Friedrich List is best known for advocating infant-
industry protection, however, Ricardo’s close friend John Stuart Mill also accepted the 
case for it.  List did not necessarily disagree with economic liberals, but recognized the 
preeminence of the nation.  List argued that the “goal of economic policy must not be 
limited to wealth maximization but must also include the development of a nation’s 
culture and power.” 84  
The Brazilian space program might demonstrate List’s corollary.  While there 
does not seem to be an economic or a truly military benefit to balance the enormous costs 
of the program, it has a direct impact on national prestige by making Brazil one of an 
elite group of international space explorers.  Furthermore, Brazil announced in June 2003 
that it would migrate a majority of their government computer systems from Microsoft to 
Linux.  The given rationale was that open source software would save money, but one 
can also assume that many Brazilians took pride in rebuffing the U.S. software giant. 
Raul Prebisch’s pessimistic “dependency theory” gave rise to infant-industry 
protection taken to an extreme to which List might not have approved.  It essentially 
stated that the “periphery states” could never compete against the “core” states.  The East 
Asian NICs, who managed their economies far more efficiently than their Latin 
competitors and progressed to ‘first-world’ status, invalidated this idea in the 1980’s.85   
Although lack of competition may be appealing for a particular industrial sector, 
it is often not in the national interest.  For example, Thomas Friedman examines the case 
of facsimile machine technology in Brazil.  When both Taiwan and Brazil entered the 
facsimile market in the 1980’s, the Brazilian Congress protected their fledgling industry 
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while Taiwan forced its to compete.  By 1994, Taiwan was the world’s leading 
manufacturer of fax machines.  At the same time, Brazilian fax machines were outdated 
and overpriced.  In 1995, Brazil in effect conceded their error and dropped the tariffs.86  
The “national” interest in this case was a liberal economic policy that would favor the 
Brazilian consumer.   
Macroeconomic activism is another strand of economic nationalism.  In this case 
the state exerts influence on the national economy.  According to Helleiner, if this serves 
the national interest, it is economic nationalism.  This section will examine one of the 
government’s most effective tools of economic manipulation, currency.   
The government can wield immense influence on the national economy simply by 
printing more or less currency, a fact more or less neglected by Adam Smith’s 
worldview.  By tying the national medium of exchange to gold or dollars, the government 
cedes much control over the national economy.  The critical determiner of nationalist 
intent in this case remains the national interest.  Although in many cases the two are 
inextricable, the good of the nation does not always reflect the good of the state.  
In the 19th century, the gold standard was praised by free traders, but deemed as a 
threat by many “economic nationalists.”  The apparent advantage for the world market 
was international currency equilibrium with a minimum of government interference.  In 
the early 19th century, at a time when his native Britain dominated world trade, Thomas 
Attwood was a vociferous critic of the gold standard.  He advocated an inconvertible 
national currency to promote national prosperity, based on the belief that government 
could control depressions and unemployment through manipulation of the cash pool.  
Attwood, an early predictor of Keynesian deficit spending, lectured on the necessity of 
retaining control of the nation’s currency.87  This imposes a responsibility on the state 
institutions to care for the nation. 
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It [money] alone supports and maintains all the great processes of 
production, distribution, and consumption; it feeds the hungry and clothes 
the naked, and breaks open prison doors, and saves families from ruin.” 88 
In the late 19th century, Canadian businessman Isaac Buchanan offered another 
reason for inconvertible currency.  He argued that it breeds national allegiance.  A man 
who has his fortune invested in a national currency that is worthless in the rest of the 
world “has an incentive to support its institutions, in addition to his patriotism, because 
he knows that if the country goes down his money will be valueless.” 89  
The previous cases assume that the gold standard was detrimental to national 
interest.  However, it some cases it may not be.  Bismarck used the gold standard to unite 
a number of smaller economies while consolidating Germany in the 1870s.90 Many “late 
developing countries” favored the gold standard because it attracted foreign investment 
by “creating a more credible and stable standard of value.”  Furthermore, adopting the 
gold standard became a “source of national prestige.”91 
By the late 20th century, U.S. dollars would replace gold as the standard for 
international currency.  In Latin America, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama went so far 
as to “dollarize,” assuming the U.S. dollar as their national currency.92 
Some countries merely fixed the exchange rate with the dollar to slow inflation.  
In the mid-1990s, Argentina instituted the Cavallo Plan, a currency board that locked the 
peso into parity with the U.S. dollar.  In the short term, this curbed hyperinflation, much 
to the relief of the Argentine nation.  However, failure to flex the standard once inflation 
was arrested would eventually lead to an overvalued peso and a collapse of the Argentine 
economy in 1999.93   Had Argentina decoupled its currency at the proper time, it might 
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have avoided financial tragedy that adversely affected the entire nation.94  This is a 
situation where, in hindsight, an astute economic nationalist might have endorsed a policy 
that allowed the peso to float once hyperinflation had been arrested.   
Autarchy, the intense government regulation of a closed economy, seems to 
epitomize the traditional definition of economic nationalism.95  In this situation, the state 
essentially cuts off commerce with the international community and attempts economic 
self-sufficiency.  This extreme measure has rarely been truly implemented.  Adam 
Muller, a conservative Prussian in the early 19th century was one advocate, criticizing the 
liberal economic policies of Metternich’s Austria.96  Around the same time, Johann 
Fichte wrote The Closed Commercial State, advocating an extremely interventionist 
government that fixed prices and wages, discouraged foreign trade, and abolished gold or 
silver as currency.  After the collapse of the world economy in the 1930s, the Nazi party 
briefly resurrected some of Muller’s ideas while searching for a more nationalistic 
economic policy.  Surprisingly, in 1933, even John Maynard Keynes made the point that 
a certain degree of economic autarchy was necessary for successful national economic 
planning.97  
The most obvious example of economic autarchy in the western hemisphere today 
is that of Cuba.  When Fidel Castro chose the communist road, he placed the nationalistic 
concerns of the state over the economic concerns of the nation.  His choice of the 
revolutionary “Che” Guevara as Minister of Industries and president of the National Bank 
of Cuba highlights this.  Only close ties with the Soviet Union kept the economy 
remotely viable.  In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the economic 
situation became dire.  Cuba has reluctantly begun preliminary liberal economic reforms, 
including liberalizing farm markets, legalizing possession of U.S. dollars, and opening 
certain sectors to foreign direct investment.98  Helleiner’s definition of economic 
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nationalism in this case would denounce Castro’s autarchic practices and embrace the 
recent exceptions as being in the best interest of the nation.    
Liberal economic nationalism endorses free trade for nationalistic reasons.  The 
most successful free traders of the 19th century, the British Empire, did so for 
nationalistic reasons.  Arguments for free trade in British Parliament cited such goals as 
“bolstering British wealth and international power”…“rendering the world a tributary to 
[Britain]”…as well as “supply[ing] the whole world with manufacturers, and [having] 
almost a monopoly of the trade of the world.”99  
Ukrainian nationalists support liberal market reforms as a means of emphasizing 
their separation from the former Soviet Union.  Quebec nationalists have long supported 
free trade as a means of minimizing their dependence on the Canadian central 
government.100  
In Latin America, the initial impetus after independence was to introduce liberal 
economic policies. Nationalists, who recently shed the yoke of colonialism, associated 
trade restrictions with Iberian tyranny.  They espoused the British model in hopes that it 
“offered both the possibility of growth in poor, sparsely populated agricultural countries 
and a vehicle for nation-building in states still struggling to assert their sovereignty 
domestically and internationally.” 101  
 In sum, there are many aspects to protectionism, but they are not necessarily 
economic nationalism.  Infant-industry protection is protectionist, but if not implemented 
wisely can have adverse effects on the national economy, as demonstrated by the 
Brazilian fax case.  Control of currency is a state prerogative, but the state must know 
when to peg currency and when to float it, as was the case in Argentina.  The economic 
impact will determine whether the policy was nationalistic or not.  Autarchy in the 
extreme is rarely good for a national economy and is especially detrimental in today’s 
globalized market.  Even autarchic Cuba has begun to make liberal economic 
concessions.  Free trade can at times be the embodiment of economic nationalism.  Great 
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Britain espoused the national advantages in the 19th century and the recently independent 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies chose free trade as the best course for their new nations.   
This section has examined the traditional meaning of economic nationalism and 
extricated a practical definition.  By making a distinction between the state and the 
nation, as well as distinguishing between an ideology of protectionism and a true concern 
for the welfare of the nation, it is possible to speculate whether it is an enabler or a 
hindrance to regional integration.  The next section will now examine Mercosur armed 
with this definition. 
D. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND MERCOSUR 
Latin American countries have shifted macroeconomic strategies since the 1980s 
to focus on export-oriented trade.102  While abandoning the dependencia model, they 
have also sought an effective approach for protecting national interests and gaining a 
competitive edge internationally.  One such model is that of regional cooperation.  With 
the apparent success of the North American Free Trade Area and the European Union, 
nations of the Southern Cone put their faith in the Mercosur, or the Common Market of 
the South.  If it were possible to demonstrate across-the-board economic growth for the 
member nations, it would be easy to surmise that the liberal economic reform that 
resulted from regional integration is within the bounds of Helleiner’s economic 
nationalism.    
In 1996, Alexander Yeats of the World Bank earned the ire of Brazil when he 
criticized Mercosur as protectionist and concluded that is was failing in its stated goal of 
trade creation.  In 1997, Edward L. Hudgins of the Cato Institute disputed that claim on 
the assumption that internal free trade was a step in the right direction.103  A 2000 study 
by Anaam Hashmi also tempered the criticism, but supports the assertion that trade 
diversion vice creation has been the result.104  
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This might imply that there is a better way to increase prosperity in the region, 
and perhaps this is the case.  The United States would like to see the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas in place.  This model is in many ways would merely resemble a bigger 
Mercosur where the United States assumes Brazil’s role as the dominant member.  
Alternatively, Mercosur could dissolve and member states could either pursue their needs 
through the World Trade Organization or withdraw from the world economy completely.  
The former is unattractive because they lose the benefits of collective bargaining.  The 
latter idea borders on the ridiculous.  Therefore, it seems that the present trade status quo 
should meet the economic nationalist’s need for benefiting the nation once an adequate 
dispute resolution system is put into place to address sectoral grievances.105 
The most pressing disparity within the common market is individual fiscal policy 
concerning currency.  While Argentina chose to stick with their currency board, Brazil 
boldly devalued the real in 1999. Although the resulting friction with Argentina 
threatened the foundations of Mercosur, the net result for Brazil was impressive.  “Brazil 
began 2002 with a solvent banking system an strong capital inflows [with] the 
recovery…in full swing.”106 The trade deficit reversed sharply to a surplus.   
Some have proposed a common currency, tentatively named the Merco, similar to 
the Euro.107  European integration is far more advanced than that of Mercosur, and the 
decision to use a common currency was laden with political motivations.  For the 
member states of Mercosur to forfeit control of interest rates, seignoirage,108 and 
exchange rates for a harmonized macroeconomic policy and minimized transactions costs 
seems unlikely in the short term.  Barry Eichengreen recommends harmonized inflation 
targeting as an alternative.   
Ironically, the Macroeconomic Marketing Group (GMM) was created in 
December 2000 with the goal of targeting inflation (under 5%), fiscal deficits (under 
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3.5% of GDP), and public debts (less than 40% of GDP).  Unfortunately, the GMM 
seems inactive in the wake of the Argentine crisis.  These benchmarks seem to be sound 
fiscal goals for the individual nations as well as the larger common market.109  
Finally, it seems like the nations of Mercosur can best ensure their prosperity 
collectively through free trade and sound, coordinated fiscal planning.  If this is true, then 
it is in the interest of the member nations to maintain active membership in the common 
market. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 Traditionally, the term “economic nationalism” has encompassed any policy that 
opposes economic liberalism.  Helleiner asserted that it should be redefined by using the 
interests of the nation as a determiner.  This in turn opened the door for a new sort of 
heresy, that economic nationalists could actually endorse liberal economic policies. 
Examining economic policies in the last two centuries supports this conclusion.  
Infant-industry protection was acceptable to economic liberals like J.S. Mill if used in 
moderation.  The case of Brazilian fax technology in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates 
that protectionism was not in the best interest of the nation, and therefore not nationalist 
in nature.  Macroeconomic activism in the form of the Argentine currency board recently 
drove the country into a recession when “floating” the currency would have been in the 
national interest.  Autarchy in Cuba has devastated the economy to the point where 
Castro is beginning to see capitalism as the answer to avoiding crippling poverty.  
Finally, liberal economic nationalism is revealed to have always existed, furthering the 
interests of a nation through trade, whether by the British Empire or the fledgling 
independent nations of Latin America.       
Based on this theory, one can now attempt to scrutinize the integration of 
Mercosur.  Applying the new understanding of economic nationalism, does further 
integration fits each member’s economic nationalist agenda?  Either it is better for 
individual member nations to embrace or withdraw from the common market.  
Unfortunately, in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, the evidence is inconclusive.  
Although more liberal trade and a common currency may lead to economic prosperity, it 
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would require a sacrifice of sovereignty and the last vestiges of economic autarchy that is 
unlikely to be acceptable to the states.  To withdrawal would seem counterproductive and 
certainly not within the member’s national interests.  While relative-gains issues and 
dispute resolution may plague further integration, it would appear that the nations are 
committed to the path of economic liberalism and cooperation holds the best prospects 
for the prosperity of their respective nations.  While it is difficult to determine whether 




The four nations of Mercosur seem to be committed to their decade-plus 
experiment with regionalism.  This thesis opened with an examination of the potential 
this arrangement carried in three domains: economic, political, and military.  It compared 
its development with that of the most successful regional arrangement to date, the 
European Union and concluded that although the means may differ, the result could 
eventually be strikingly similar.   
The next chapter examined the treaties that created Mercosur through the 
theoretical lens of Robert Putnam and then tested his theory by examining the disputes 
that have threatened to dissolve Mercosur.  It concluded that the negotiations surrounding 
Mercosur could be classified in the realist tradition.  This means that the member states 
must believe it is in their individual interests to strengthen Mercosur, a crucial 
assumption for the next chapter to be relevant.  
The last chapter addressed economic nationalism.  If one assumes that states are 
nationalistic, does this present an obstacle to further integration?  The answer is once 
again ‘no’.  By accepting Helleiner’s theory, national interest once again determines 
whether economic liberalism is nationalistic. 
So Mercosur has a path in front of it.  Barring obstacles, it could develop along 
the same lines as the European Union.  This would mean more economic integration, 
stronger supranational institutions, and possibly a standing multi-national peacekeeping 
force.   
The obstacles examined here seem to be superceded by the national interest, a 
subjective conclusion that cannot be fully examined in this thesis.  What is important is 
whether or not the member nations believe that a stronger Mercosur is in their national 
interest. 
There are strong motivations for further integration that have been noted in this 
work.  Increased bargaining power within the international system is a powerful one.  
This could physically manifest itself with a seat for Brazil on the U.N. Security Council.  
On the economic front, Mercosur has already attempted to leverage its market for 
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favorable terms of trade from the European Union and the North American Free Trade 
Area.  Solidarity is essential to this end.   
Strategically, Mercosur appears to be in the interests of its member states.  We 
can expect to see further broadening and some deepening of its institutions.  Its success 
will be determined by its ability to carve out a significant niche in the new international 
system.  
This development should have a major impact on U.S. policy toward the region.  
The ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of pursuing bilateral trade agreements will undermine 
the bargaining position of Mercosur and ensure terms favorable to the U.S.  This may not 
be the wisest course due to a long history of resentment aimed at the United States in the 
region.  Ultimately, political stability and physical security in the region benefits actors in 
both North and South America.  By making economic concessions and dealing directly 
with Mercosur, the U.S. could insist on a regional peacekeeping force and a democracy 
clause.  It is only a matter of time before the WTO undermines agricultural subsidies. 
Offering this compromise saves the U.S. government billions and would be seen as a 
major concession in South America.  Done properly, this process could soothe relations 
in the Western Hemisphere, gain favorable access to a vast market for goods, and gain 
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